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I. Introduction
Achieving our global goals of universal access to clean energy and averting a climate
crisis will require a mass scale-up of investments in renewable energy infrastructure,
redirecting capital from carbon intensive energy and transport systems. The International
Renewable Energy Agency estimates that the transformation of the energy system alone
will need cumulative investments to reach USD 110 trillion by 2050 to keep the rise in global
temperatures to well below 2°C and towards 1.5°C during this century. Of that amount, over
80% will need to be invested in renewables, energy efficiency, end-use electrification, and
power grids and flexibility.1
The private sector and private finance will play an important role in scaling renewable
energy generation, transmission, and storage. Much of this investment will be cross-border,
as capital and technology must flow to developing and emerging economies to bridge the
widening regional differences in the rate and amount of renewable energy investments.
To help accelerate a shift of finance into renewable investments by foreign companies, it is
critical to address the key constraints that hinder the scale-up of renewable investment, as
well as the key determinants that would accelerate the necessary capital for a sustainable
energy transition. Understanding these factors is a critical input to policy-making across a
range of government agencies and functions, for development finance institutions, and for
other international organizations.
To contribute to the understanding of what drives investments in renewables, we designed
and carried out a survey targeting industry experts in the renewable energy space, to
understand the range of political, regulatory, and economic factors that shape their
investment decisions. The survey complements desk research into the determinants and
constraints to scaling investment; the findings from that research are presented in our report,
“Scaling Investment in Renewable Energy Generation to Achieve Sustainable Development
Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and 13 (Climate Action) and the Paris Agreement:
Roadblocks and Drivers”.2 This report focuses on one particular part of that analysis: namely
the relevance of international investment agreements (IIAs or investment treaties), like the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), to investor decision making. Proponents of IIAs advocate that
IIAs are important drivers to investment in renewable energy; we therefore designed our
survey to assess this claim, and the relative importance of IIAs against other factors. This
report focuses on the specific findings of the survey that are relevant to that analysis.

1 International Renewable Energy Agency, “Global Renewables Outlook: Energy Transformation 2050” (April 2020) at p. 34,
https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Global-Renewables-Outlook-2020.
2 Mithatcan Aydos, Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Ladan Mehranvar, Theodoros Iliopoulos, and Sunayana Sasmal,
“Scaling Investment in Renewable Energy Generation to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean
Energy) and 13 (Climate Action) and the Paris Agreement: Roadblocks and Drivers” (New York: CCSI, 2022), https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/content/renewable-energy-investment-roadblocks-drivers.
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In the first section of this report, we present our survey findings and consider the role of
IIAs in promoting renewable energy investments.3 In the second section, we assess the
relevance of the investor-state dispute settlement (or ISDS) as a risk mitigation tool for
foreign investors in renewable energy sectors. In the third section, we analyze the elements
of legal stability in host countries that are important to renewable energy investors. In the
final section, we discuss recent ISDS cases related to renewable energy, and explore how,
as interpreted, IIAs can undermine the policy space that governments need to implement
the policies and measures that are most important and most effective at driving investment
in renewable energy. It is important to note that this report focuses, in particular, on legal
and regulatory factors, but that the survey, and the longer report to which it contributed,
consider other—often more critical—factors, such as economic and financial ones.

3 The role, relevance and impact of the ECT with respect to the energy transition is being currently debated in the European
Union. See, European Commission, “Agreement in principle reached on Modernised Energy Charter Treaty” (News Article, 24 Jun
2022), https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/agreement-principle-reached-modernised-energy-charter-treaty-2022-06-24_en.

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENTS

DECEMBER 2022

4

II. The Role of Investment Treaties in
Attracting Foreign Investment
One of the most controversial tools advocated by some lawyers and international
institutions to promote investments in renewables is the use of IIAs. 4 Investment treaties
provide host state guarantees and protection to investors of counterparty states. 5
Common substantive treaty provisions include protections against discrimination and
uncompensated (direct or indirect) expropriation, and guarantees of fair and equitable
treatment of foreign investors. Most of these treaties grant foreign investors the right
to sue host governments and seek damages based on alleged treaty violations before
ad hoc, party-appointed international arbitration tribunals (commonly known as ISDS).
These tribunals issue binding awards, which may necessitate the host state to pay
monetary compensation to claimant investors, often on the order of tens of millions of
dollars and occasionally billions. 6 There have been 1190 publicly-known ISDS cases as of
December 31, 2021.7
Investment treaties restrict the ability of governments to act (or not act) in certain ways
that may impact the economic interests of foreign investors who seek to invest, or who have
invested, in those countries. Despite this, almost every country has signed several such
treaties over the past half century under the assumption that additional legal protections

4 Paul E. Comeaux and N. Stephan Kinsella, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative
Law, Vol 15(1) (1994): art. 2, https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol15/iss1/2/;
Priyanka Kher and Dongwook Chun, “Policy Options to Mitigate Political Risk and Attract FDI” (Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank Group, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34380. Also, a number of law firms have published
articles on managing political risk through bilateral investment treaties. See e.g., Matthew Coleman and Thomas Innes,
“Managing Political Risk Through Bilateral Investment Treaties” (Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 2 Oct 2018), https://www.steptoe.
com/en/news-publications/managing-political-risk-through-bilateral-investment-treaties.html.
5 “Primer on International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/primer-international-investment-treaties-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement#!#_ftn14.
6 As of June 2021, the average amount states are ordered to pay claimants is USD 437.5 million. Removing a set of awards
against Russia, which are particularly large outliers ordering that government to pay USD 50 billion to investor claimants,
the average ISDS award is USD 169.5 million. Both the amounts claimed and the size of the awards are increasing. On top
of this, the average legal costs for states are approximately USD 4.7 million, and the average arbitration tribunal’s fees are
USD 1 million. Ibid; Deborah Ruff, Julia Kalinina Belcher, and Charles Golsong, “Financing a Claim or Defense” (London:
Global Arbitration Review, 14 Jan 2022), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-investment-treaty-protectionand-enforcement/first-edition/article/financing-claim-or-defence; Matthew Hodgson, Yarik Kryvoi and Daniel Hrcka, “Costs,
Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration” (London: BIICL and Allen & Overy, June 2021), https://www.biicl.org/
documents/136_isds-costs-damages-duration.pdf.
7 “ISDS Navigator Update: 1190 Known Investment Treaty Cases by 31 December 2021,” Investment Policy Hub,
UNCTAD, 26 Apr 2022, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/news/hub/1688/20220426-isds-navigator-update-1190-knowninvestment-treaty-cases-by-31-december-2021.
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for foreign investors enforceable outside of the domestic judicial system of the host state
will encourage further investment, 8 which, in turn, will promote domestic development.
The assertion is that investment treaties will deter capricious, arbitrary, and discriminatory
state conduct, and protect investors from costs incurred in the event of a breach of those
commitments,9 thereby reducing a barrier to investment and increasing investment flows.
However, decades of research have failed to establish that legal protections contained within
investment treaties have a discernable impact on promoting foreign investment flows.10 A
2021 meta-analysis of 74 studies looking at the effects of investment treaties on foreign direct
investment (FDI) found that investment treaties “have an effect on [FDI] that is so small as
to be considered as negligible or zero.”11 Another meta-analysis from 2015 concluded that
“… the empirical evidence on the basis of a meta-analysis suggests that the FDI promotion
effect of [bilateral investment treaties] seems to be economically negligible.”12 In the case
of renewable energy investments, researchers have found no evidence to show that the ECT
has had a positive influence on FDI inflows in the renewable energy sector.13 Ironically, a 2018
report concluded that countries that have terminated IIAs in the recent past have actually
had or are likely to have increased foreign investment following the treaties’ termination.14
8 Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Brooke Güven and Jesse Coleman, “Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations
for States” (New York: CCSI, 2018), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/pics/Cost-and-Benefits-of-InvestmentTreaties-Practical-Considerations-for-States-ENG-mr.pdf [Johnson et al. 2018]; Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Nathan Lobel,
“Briefing Note: Aligning International Investment Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals” (Nov 2020); Joachim
Pohl, “Societal benefits and costs of International Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available empirical
evidence” OECD Working Papers on International Investment (OECD, 2018), at pp. 16-17, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
docserver/e5f85c3d-en.pdf?expires=1668261267&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=EA66F1BE0FEBA35907ED01B401CC8C53
[Pohl, 2018]; Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries?,” World Development 33, no. 10 (2005): 1567, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X05001233
[Neumayer and Spess, 2005]. The authors conclude that investment treaties appear to be useful “substitutes” for domestic
political reform. However, see Jason Yackee, “Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link Between Investment Treaties
and Foreign Direct Investment,” in Karl Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Books, 2009), Chapter 14, at p. 379, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_books/6/. Here the author
criticizes the study by Neumayer and Spess, finding that a replication with a larger dataset does not produce the same result of a
positive correlation between bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment. In fact, Yackee writes that investors have
little awareness or appreciation of specific investment treaties as “multinational corporations have historically only haphazardly
and imperfectly institutionalized general “political risk assessment” procedures,” at p. 381.
9 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
1960-2000,” International Organization, Vol 60(4) (2006): 811, at pp. 823-824, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
international-organization/article/competing-for-capital-the-diffusion-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-19602000/474DA539
6C266F75C5C26752D22620C7; Neumayer and Spess, 2005, at p. 1572; Also see Julia Calvert and Kyla Tienhaara, “Beyond ‘Once
BITten, Twice Shy’: Defending the Legitimacy of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in Peru and Australia,” Review of International
Political Economy (2022), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09692290.2022.2134172?needAccess=true [Calvert
and Tienhaara, 2022]. The authors discuss the perception of stability and good governance as created by investment treaties.
For e.g., “MINCETUR officials asserted that [the Peru-US Trade Agreement] would ‘reinforce the stability of economic policy
and institutions’ and ‘reduce perceptions of country risk amongst international economic agents’,” at p. 7.
10 See Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Books, 2009); Lauge
N. Skovgaard Poulsen, “The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the
Evidence” in Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 539
[Poulsen, 2010]; Pohl, 2018; Josef C. Brada, Zdenek Drabek and Ichiro Iwasaki, “Does Investor Protection Increase Foreign
Direct Investment? A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol 35(1) (2021): 34 [Brada et al., 2021].
11 Brada et al., 2021. This is a meta-analysis of 74 studies looking at the effects of IIAs on foreign direct investment. They found that
IIAs “have an effect on [foreign direct investment] that is so small as to be considered as negligible or zero.” See also Christian Bellak,
“Economic Impact of Investment Agreements” (Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 200, Vienna: Vienna University
of Economics and Business, 2015), https://research.wu.ac.at/en/publications/economic-impact-of-investment-agreements-3
[Bellak, 2015]. This is another meta-analysis, which concludes that “… the empirical evidence on the basis of a meta-analysis
suggests that the FDI promotion effect of [bilateral investment treaties] … seems to be economically negligible,” at p. 19.
12 Bellak, 2015.
13 Kyla Tienhaara & Christian Downie, “Risky Business? The Energy Charter Treaty, Renewable Energy, and Investor-State
Disputes,” Global Governance, Vol 24(3) (2018): 451, https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02403009.
14 Public Citizen, “Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively Affected Countries’ Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows,” Research Brief, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch (April 2018), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/
uploads/pcgtw_fdi-inflows-from-bit-termination_1.pdf.
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Despite the lack of supporting evidence, proponents of the investment treaty system
continue to argue that IIAs are effective at mobilizing investment and are therefore critical
to advancing the necessary scale-up of renewable energy investments. This narrative is
being used, for example, by the ECT Secretariat in defense against the growing criticism of
the treaty’s protection of fossil fuel investment and therefore its incompatibility with the
Paris Agreement.15
Understanding the factors that investors consider most critical or important in their
decision-making process regarding energy investments offers a complementary path to
answering the question of whether IIAs actually encourage investment flows. The findings
of our survey of renewable energy investors and industry experts on what really matters
to them when investing in new foreign markets support the empirical conclusions that
investment treaties are not decisive in investment decision-making.
When asked to choose the top-five factors that deterred their company from investing in a
new market, the majority of respondents chose: political instability, legal instability in the
energy sector, instability of fiscal and/or energy markets, the macroeconomic profile of a
host state, and corruption. Only one respondent identified international legal protections
by way of IIAs as among their top five deterring factors.16 See Figure 1.
Figure 1: Top deterrents to investing in renewable energy abroad

To delve deeper into the decision-making process of investors, several interviews were
carried out as an extension of the survey. When asked about legal factors that were
critical to investors, almost all those interviewed talked about the importance of domestic
legal factors, including land leases, land ownership issues, tax laws, and domestic legal
15 Communication of the Secretary General on the Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (1 Jul 2022)
International Energy Charter, https://www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/communication-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-modernisation-of-the-energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=72821feec70fab2743d97ad51eafb987.
16 This is also the conclusion by Poulsen, 2010, at p. 4, in relation to investors in general.
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frameworks. Investment treaties were not a decisive factor in their decision-making process.
One respondent said that, “investment agreements are not decisive in our investment
decision-making. As a sponsor of renewable energy projects in Chile and, soon Colombia,
we don’t contemplate treaty-based arbitration as part of our due diligence. It’s not the
recourse in the event of a dispute. If it were, that would essentially signify an extreme
scenario where we have been expropriated. But we don’t anticipate that happening in the
first place.” Another respondent echoed that “[the presence of IIAs] wouldn’t be a very
important factor. It wouldn’t make or break the decision on whether or not we invest.”
Further, when respondents were asked about pre-investment legal counsel, not a single one
said anything about receiving advice on investing based on the presence of an IIA. On the
other hand, factors such as connections with government officials or government agencies
seem to be critical, especially in countries that have a higher political risk. Respondents
noted that they use “extensive relationships with the government, the embassy, the
ambassador,” and other “connections at the energy ministry and other ministry levels” at
the pre-investment stage, and “lobbying and political influence” post-investment, in the
event of a dispute. The utility of treaties therefore appears to be far less important—if at
all—compared to diplomatic channels and connections to government officials.
A combined reading of the survey responses together with the interviews suggests that
other legal elements may be more critical when thinking about building an enticing
investment environment for clean energy investments (along with relevant, and sometimes
far more decisive, economic and financial components), and that IIAs are not among the
most important ex ante determinants for foreign investors in the renewable energy space.
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III. The Importance of ISDS as a Risk Mitigation
Tool for Renewable Energy Investors
While investors may not be aware of—or place much emphasis on—the existence of an IIA
between their home state and a potential host state when they are making a decision about
where to invest, they may take advantage of the strong protections afforded by IIAs when
or if a dispute arises post-establishment. This does not mean, however, that those investors
would not have made their investments in the absence of a treaty. Indeed, law firms often
advise their clients that have already decided to invest in a specific jurisdiction to (re)structure
their investments so as to benefit from additional treaty-based protections.17 For instance,
investors have been encouraged to “audit their corporate structure and change it, if needed,
to ensure they are protected by an investment treaty,” and that such restructuring “should
take place before any climate-related dispute with the State has arisen or is reasonably
foreseeable.”18 Accordingly, investment treaties afford additional protections to investors
without actually influencing their investment decisions.
To find out whether ISDS features as a critical risk mitigation tool for foreign investors,
respondents were asked to rank six such tools in the order in which they are important in
their foreign investment decisions. Treaty-based investment arbitration was one of the two
lowest-ranked options of six risk mitigation strategies, together with green insurance. The
three highest-ranked tools were guarantee instruments, credit guarantees, and co-investing
with local or prominent stakeholders. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: Average ranking of six risk mitigation tools, where six was most important

17 For example, Jones Day, “Restructuring Recommended after CJEU Decision on Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties”
(Cleveland: Jones Day, 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2018/03/restructuring-recommended-after-cjeudecision-on-i; Jones Day, “Climate Change and Investor-State Dispute Settlement” (Newsletter, 2022), https://www.jonesday.
com/en/insights/2022/02/climate-change-and-investorstate-dispute-settlement.
18 Jones Day, “Climate Change and Investor-State Dispute Settlement” (Newsletter, 2022), https://www.jonesday.com/en/
insights/2022/02/climate-change-and-investorstate-dispute-settlement.
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IV. Who Benefits from IIAs and ISDS?
To date, dozens of ISDS cases related to renewable energy policies have been successfully
brought against several states under the Energy Charter Treaty, resulting in millions of
dollars in awarded compensation. The system is therefore profiting at least some investors.
But who exactly are these investors?
As of September 2022, there have been at least 80 publicly-known ISDS cases related to
changes in renewable energy policies, the majority of which have been brought under the
ECT against Czechia, Italy, and Spain.19 These countries used feed-in tariffs (FITs) in the early
to mid-2000s to induce investment in renewable energy sectors. Initially, the FIT policies
were successful in attracting significant investment. However, in the context of a profound
financial crisis in 2008, many European countries were unable to maintain their renewable
energy support policies.20 For instance, at the end of 2012, Spain’s tariff deficit was more
than EUR 29 billion, or 3% of the Spanish GDP.21 To respond to this unforeseen situation,
governments rolled back or revoked renewable energy incentives policies in order to stop
the tariff deficit from growing further.22 Investors have claimed the regulatory changes
violated the protection of legitimate expectations through the fair and equitable treatment
(FET) standard under the ECT.
To date, Spain has been subject to at least 51 known ISDS cases. Of the 27 awards as of
November 2022, 21 have found Spain in violation of the FET standard. So far, Spain owes
more than EUR 1.2 billion in compensation to successful investors, which is “equal to the
country’s entire spending commitment to fight the climate crisis or five times what it spent
to alleviate energy poverty in 2021.”23 Spain also owes EUR 101 million in associated legal
and arbitration fees.
The investors that have brought the majority of cases under the ECT against Spain have been
upstream financial investors. Unlike investors that produce, generate, store or distribute
renewable energy, a recent study notes that “[i]n 89% of the cases [brought against Spain
as of May 2022]… the claimant is not a renewable energy company but an equity fund or
19 Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute settlement Cases and Climate Action (Geneva: UNCTAD, Sept 2022), https://unctad.
org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2022d7_en.pdf.
20 Theodoros G. Iliopoulos, “Price Support Schemes in the Service of the EU’s Low-Carbon Energy Transition,” in Zachariadis
et al. (eds), Economic Instruments for a Low-Carbon Future (Edward Elgar Publishing, 28 Jul 2020), https://www.elgaronline.
com/view/edcoll/9781839109904/9781839109904.00011.xml; Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, “Spain and Investment
Arbitration: The Renewable Energy Explosion” (Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2016), https://
www.cigionline.org/static/documents/documents/ISA%20Paper%20No.17.pdf [García-Castrillón, 2016].
21 Pablo del Río and Pere Mir-Artigues, “A Cautionary Tale: Spain’s Solar PV Investment Bubble” (Winnipeg: International
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014), at p. 9, https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/rens_ct_spain.pdf.
22 Theodoros Iliopoulos, “Renewable Energy Regulation: Feed-in Tariff Schemes under Recession Conditions,” Lexxion:
The Legal Publisher, Vol 4(2) (2016): 110, at p. 110, https://enlr.lexxion.eu/article/ENLR/2016/2/7; Sofia-Natalia Boemi
and Agis M. Papadopoulos, “Times of Recession: Three Different Renewable Energy Stories from the Mediterranean
Region,” in Evanthie Michalena and Jeremey Maxwell Hills (eds), Renewable Energy Governance: Complexities and
Challenges (Springer, 2013), https://books.google.com/books?id=DSq5BAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_
summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
23 Lucía Bárcena and Fabian Flues, “From Solar Dream to Legal Nightmare: How Financial Investors, Law Firms and Arbitrators
are Profiting from the Investment Arbitration Boom in Spain” (Transnational Institute and Powershift, 31 May 2022), at p. 4,
https://www.tni.org/en/publication/from-solar-dream-to-legal-nightmare [Bárcena and Flues, 2022].
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other type of financial investor, with a direct or indirect stake in companies operating in the
sector, including banks.”24 The main focus of upstream, speculative investors is to achieve
maximum financial returns, irrespective of the field in which they operate.25 They are often
unknown to the public, and their modus operandi is to remain in a certain business venture
for 5-7 years, reap the benefits of that business, then divest and find another profitable
venture.26 This is quite different from an investor that operates a renewable energy project
in any given country, has a direct relationship with the government in that country, and is
hopeful that both the project and the relationship are long-lasting. In fact, in some of the
Spanish cases, the speculative investors sold their interests and profited substantially from
those transactions, yet received further compensation as a result of their arbitration claims.27

24 Ibid, at p. 12.
25 Joseph L. Staats and Glen Biglaiser, “The Effects of Judicial Strength and Rule of Law on Portfolio Investment in the
Developing World,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol 92(3) (2011): 609, at p. 610 https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956540.
26 CEO and TNI (2014), “Profiting from crisis: How corporations and lawyers are scavenging profits from Europe ́s crisis
countries” (March 2014), https://www.tni.org/files/download/profiting_from_crisis_1.pdf; Bárcena and Flues, 2022, at p. 12.
27 In her dissenting opinion in the Watkins v. Spain case, Dr. Helene Ruiz Fabri states: “Last but not least, contrary to what the
Majority considered (at para 593(ii) of the Award), the investment of the Claimants was not “destroyed”. The investment was
bought at €91 million in 2011, valued €98 million at the moment of the alleged intervention of the wrongful actin in 2014 and
sold at €133 million in 2016 (which meant a return of 11.2%). What is the Majority considering as “destroyed” and what is the
Tribunal repairing exactly, when awarding damages in the sum of €77 million, without taking into account the date of the
investment and the impact of the context on reparation?” See Watkins Holdings S.à r.l. and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case no. ARB/15/44, Award (21 Jan 2020), at para. 16, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-watkins-holdings-s-ar-l-and-others-v-kingdom-of-spain-none-currently-available-wednesday-4th-november-2015.
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V. Legal Stability as a Driving Factor for
Renewable Energy Investments
While the presence of IIAs and the reliance on ISDS as a risk mitigation tool do not appear to be
important to most renewable energy investors, the survey results do confirm the importance
of stability to investors’ decision-making process. Among the factors driving foreign investment
in renewables, an overwhelming majority of respondents considered “legal stability,” “political
stability,” and “stability of fiscal and energy markets” as critical or very important in their
investment decisions. This section focuses on the stability of legal frameworks, which includes
both contractual and regulatory frameworks, in the renewables sector.
When scoping out a new market, investors will assess, among other factors, whether a state’s
legal institutions are well developed, whether the substance of the law is conducive to foreign
investment, whether they will have access to effective dispute settlement processes, and
whether the rule of law (in both substance and process) is well entrenched. A stable investment
climate is in the interest of states as well. The lack of legal stability—for instance, by way
of frequent, unpredictable, and arbitrary regulatory changes by the state—can discourage
investments or provoke disputes with investors, which will ultimately affect the development
of the renewable energy sector of a country.28 Likewise, the potential benefits for the state (and
the public) depend on the stability of an investment project; if renewables projects are stalled,
targets related to sustainable, low-carbon, and affordable energy may not be met or realized.
A number of key characteristics define the type of stability expected of a state’s legal and
regulatory framework:
▶

laws and regulations are publicly available, uniformly administered and applied, and provide
a means for affected actors to communicate with relevant authorities;29

▶

laws and regulations serve clear policy objectives, such as economic development, social
welfare or environmental protection,30 are based on sound legal and empirical evidence; and
allow for the mutual benefits of investors and the state;

▶

the governance framework is responsive to changing circumstances affecting either the
state or the investor;31 and
investors are protected from arbitrary or discriminatory government decisions, and
domestic courts will provide impartial means to uphold investors’ legal rights and enforce
their commercial contracts.32

▶

28 Miguel Mendonça, Stephen Lacey and Frede Hvelplund, “Stability, Participation and Transparency in Renewable Energy
Policy: Lessons from Denmark and the United States,” Policy and Society, Vol 27(4) (2009): 379, https://academic.oup.com/
policyandsociety/article/27/4/379/6420858.
29 Transparency and Predictability for Investment Policies Addressing National Security Concerns: A Survey of Practices
(Paris: OECD, 2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/40700254.pdf.
30 OECD/Korea Development Institute, “Improving Regulatory Governance: Trends, Practices and the Way Forward” (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2017): 20, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/improving-regulatory-governance_9789264280366-en#page22.
31 Lisa E. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum, with James Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal Reforms on Country Attractiveness:
Learning from the Facts,” in Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2011-12 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013): 345, at p. 375, https://oxia.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-iic/9780199983025.016.0008/law-iic-9780199983025document-8?prd=IC. See also, Lou Wells, “It’s Just a Clause, isn’t it?” (CONNEX Support Unit, n.d.), https://www.connex-unit.
org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Clause-1-EN.pdf. The author provides some guidance and recommendations on the use of
stabilization clauses in government contracts with foreign investors.
32 Joseph L. Staats and Glen Biglaiser, “The Effects of Judicial Strength and Rule of Law on Portfolio Investment in the
Developing World,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol 92(3) (2011): 609, at p. 613, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956540.
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Investment treaty proponents argue that IIAs and ISDS are essential means of meeting
investors’ expectations of legal stability. However, tribunals have interpreted IIAs as
providing for absolute stability in the legal and business environment of host states, far
exceeding aspects of regulatory stability that matter to investors and, at the same time,
undermining the flexibility that is important to both states and investors. Specifically,
many ISDS tribunals have held that general legislation (even in the absence of specific
stabilization commitments) can give rise to legitimate expectations that a regulatory
framework will remain unchanged.33
One well-known example of how a tribunal has interpreted the FET standard as
implicating an absolute stability obligation is in the case of Occidental v. Ecuador I.34
That tribunal noted that under the FET standard, “there is an obligation not to alter the
legal and business environment in which the investment has been made,”35 and that the
stability requirement is “an objective requirement that does not depend on whether the
Respondent has proceeded in good faith or not.”36 More recent cases, including several
of the cases brought by renewable energy investors against Spain, have maintained
the strict standard of absolute stability, even over the objections of dissenters. As one
dissenting arbitrator opined in the Renergy v. Spain case, “[t]he expectation of a relatively
(or absolutely) immutable rate of return identified by the Majority is not supported by the
evidence or the case-law. It is an approach that is neither legitimate nor reasonable.”37
Reading a commitment of absolute stabilization into the FET standard goes beyond
general principles of legal certainty, including those of the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive
2018/2001, which requires “stability of the financial support” granted to renewable energy
projects but explicitly allows Member States to “adjust the level of support in accordance
with objective criteria, provided that such criteria are established in the original design
33 SolEs Badajoz GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case no. ARB/15/38, Award (31 Jul 2019), para. 313, https://jusmundi.
com/en/document/decision/en-soles-badajoz-gmbh-v-kingdom-of-spain-none-currently-available-monday-24th-august-2015;
Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case no. ARB/15/20, Award (15 Jul 2019), para. 388, https://
jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-cube-infrastructure-fund-sicav-and-others-v-kingdom-of-spain-award-monday-15th
-july-2019; OperaFund Eco-Invest SICAV PLC and Schwab Holding AG v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case no. ARB/15/36, Award (6
Sept 2019), para. 295, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-operafund-eco-invest-sicav-plc-and-schwab-holding
-ag-v-kingdom-of-spain-none-currently-available-tuesday-11th-august-2015; 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case no. ARB/15/15, Award (31 May 2019), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-9ren-holding-s-a-r-l-v-kingdomof-spain-decision-of-the-ad-hoc-committee-on-the-non-disputing-partys-application-to-file-a-written-submission-friday-19th-november-2021. A small number of other tribunals have held that such general legislation cannot give rise to legitimate expectations that the regulatory framework would remain unchanged. For example, see Charanne v. Spain, Arb. No. 062/2012, Final
Award (21 Jan 2016), para. 499, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-charanne-b-v-and-construction-investments-s-a-r-l-v-spain-final-award-thursday-21st-january-2016#decision_112; Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,
SCC Case no. V2013/153, Award (12 Jul 2016), para. 775, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/es-isolux-infrastructure-netherlands-b-v-c-reino-de-espana-laudo-sunday-17th-july-2016; WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic,
PCA Case no. 2014-19, Award (15 May 2019), para. 569, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-wa-investments-europa-nova-limited-v-the-czech-republic-none-currently-available-tuesday-1st-january-2013.
34 Federico Ortino, “The Obligation of Regulatory Stability in the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: How Far Have We
Come?,” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol 21(4) (2018): 845, at pp. 846-847 & 851, https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/
jieclw/v21y2018i4p845-865..html.
35 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (I), LCIA Case no. UN3467, Award (1 Jul 2004),
para. 191, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-occidental-exploration-and-production-company-v-republic-ofecuador-i-award-thursday-1st-july-2004.
36 Occidental v. Ecuador I, para. 186.
37 Renergy v. Spain, para 48. Also see EDF (Services) Limited v. Republic of Romania, ICSID Case no. ARB/05/13, Award (8 Oct
2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0267.pdf: “The idea that legitimate expectations, and
therefore FET, imply the stability of the legal and business framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly-broad and
unqualified formulation. The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the regulation of economic activities, in contrast
with the State’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life,” at para. 217.
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of the support scheme.”38 The Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently
held that “economic operators cannot justifiably claim a legitimate expectation that
an existing situation which may be altered by the national authorities in the exercise of
their discretionary power will be maintained.”39 Similarly, in the domestic claims brought
against Spain, the Spanish Supreme Court has held that any diligent operator should have
known that the energy sector is subject to intense administrative intervention due to its
significance to the general public interest.40

38 European Union, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, OJ L 328 (21 Dec 2018), Art. 6.1 and Art. 6.2, http://data.europa.eu/
eli/dir/2018/2001/oj.
39 Italian Court (Tenth Chamber), Joined Cases C-180/18, C-186/18 and C-287/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:605, para. 31, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2019%3A605; Italian Court (Fifth Chamber), Joined
Cases C-798/18 and C-799/18, C 217/2, para. 42, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62018CA0798.
In the latter case brought by investors against Italy, the CJEU reaffirmed the Italian Constitutional Court’s reasoning that the
reform in the incentives policy ”constitutes an intervention that, as regards the fair balancing of the opposing interests at
stake, addresses a public interest intended to combine the policy of supporting the production of energy from renewable
sources with making the related costs payable by end users of electricity more sustainable. It held, furthermore, that the
alteration of the incentive scheme at issue in the main proceedings was neither unforeseeable nor unexpected, so that a
prudent and circumspect economic operator would have been able to take account of possible legislative developments,
considering the temporary and changeable nature of support schemes,” at p. 16.
40 García-Castrillón, 2016.
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VI. Conclusion
The findings of the survey confirm decades of research that have failed to establish that legal
protections contained within investment treaties have a discernable impact on promoting
foreign investment flows, including in the renewable energy sectors. While the survey
confirms that elements of legal stability are important to investors, investment treaties, as
interpreted by tribunals, impose an obligation of absolute stability that undermines states’
use of policy tools to attract and govern investment.
The proliferation of claims and threatened claims challenging changes to renewable
energy incentives schemes substantially increases the cost to states of implementing
such policy tools that necessarily require flexibility in light of complex and evolving
technologies, financial factors, and assumptions about costs and markets, among other
changing circumstances.41 The “regulatory chill” that is emerging in light of increasingly
costly investor–state disputes may indeed undermine the very tools that are effective at
promoting investments in renewable energy.
States who are in favour of achieving climate goals should consider withdrawing from their
investment treaties in order to maintain the necessary policy space to implement effective
and urgent climate action policies.42 This analysis, together with the more extensive
discussion of the drivers of renewable energy investments in “Scaling Investment in
Renewable Energy Generation to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals 7 (Affordable
and Clean Energy) and 13 (Climate Action) and the Paris Agreement: Roadblocks and
Drivers” should reassure states that withdrawing from investment treaties will not affect
investments into their renewable energy sectors.43

41 See James Zhan and Joachim Karl, “Investment Incentives for Sustainable Development,” in Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehman,
Lisa Sachs, Lise Johnson, and Perrine Toledano (eds), Rethinking Investment Incentives (New York: Columbia University Press,
2016): 204, http://cup.columbia.edu/book/rethinking-investment-incentives/9780231172981; Lise Johnson and Perrine
Toledano, “Investment Incentives: A Survey of Policies and Approaches for Sustainable Investment” (New York: CCSI, 2022),
at pp. 55 & 119, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/Investment-Incentives-policiesapproaches-sustainable-investment-CCSI-Oct-2022.pdf.
42 Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Should the European Union Fix, Leave or Kill the Energy Charter Treaty?” CCSI (9 Feb 2021), https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/news/should-european-union-fix-leave-or-kill-energy-charter-treaty.
43 Public Citizen, “Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively Affected Countries’ Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows,” Research Brief, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch (April 2018), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/
uploads/pcgtw_fdi-inflows-from-bit-termination_1.pdf.
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